

# **Tropic Lightning Transformation**

**A Monograph**

**by**

**MAJ George Glaze**

**United States Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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To manage the many strategic concerns and threats to United States' interests in his area of responsibility (AOR), the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Pacific, or USCINCPAC, must have access to military assets that will provide him a variety of readily available options for effective response to missions that span the spectrum of warfare. Force providers in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps provide capabilities that enable USCINCPAC to implement viable options in dealing with regional shaping and crisis response situations. These options are executed in the form of force packages designed to provide the proper amount of military force to bring conflict resolution.

With the dynamic and ever-increasing theater threats, a concern arises as to whether USCINCPAC has forces able to meet his strategic requirements. One of the larger forces available in theater, and the only infantry division (ID) readily available, is the Army's 25<sup>th</sup> ID (Light). But the Army may need to provide USCINCPAC with a more relevant force; the current light division organization may not be as agile and responsive as needed to meet AOR requirements. Can the transformation of the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) into an Interim Division (IDIV) better enable USCINCPAC to meet the strategic land warfare requirements in the Pacific AOR?

The Army Chief of Staff is challenging his forces to remain relevant and provide the CINCs with a more responsive and strategic dominating force. The Interim Division possesses many capabilities that can provide USCINCPAC with the strategic land warfare options he needs. The unique IDIV improvements in the areas of agility, tailorability, survivability and sustainability match the strategic land warfare requirements of the PACOM AOR. The IDIV capabilities meet USCINCPAC's current shortfall in meeting AOR strategic requirements. With the IDIV, USCINCPAC is better equipped to meet Pacific Rim strategic requirements.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

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*History is not kind to nations that go to sleep. Pearl Harbor woke us up and we managed to win, although we are already forgetting the dark days when victory was uncertain, when it looked as though the scales might be tipped the other way.<sup>1</sup>*

--George C. Kenney

A recent front-page headline from the Washington Post declares “China Plans Major Boost in Spending for Military.” The article discusses China increasing defense spending by nearly eighteen percent, the biggest expansion in real terms in the last twenty years.<sup>2</sup> The news causes anxiety for many, but maybe for none more than the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), Admiral Dennis Cutler Blair. As the senior military commander responsible for U.S. interests in the Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters, he leads the largest of the unified commands and directs Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force operations in a region extending over more than 100 million square miles.

The USPACOM mission statement reads: “Ready today and preparing for tomorrow, the U.S. Pacific Command enhances security and promotes peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region by deterring aggression, responding to crisis, and fighting to win.”<sup>3</sup> The ability to accomplish such a broad mission in such a large area requires great flexibility. The vital U.S. security interests in this portion of the globe demand the best attention and presence the U.S. can offer.

### Research Question

To manage these strategic concerns, the USPACOM Commander-in-Chief (CINC), or USCINCPAC, must have access to military assets that will provide a variety

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<sup>1</sup> AF Doctrine Center, *Air Campaign Planning Handbook*, Warfare Studies Institute at the College of Aerospace Doctrine, (Maxwell AFB., March 2000) 5.

<sup>2</sup> John Pomfret, “China Plans Major Boost In Spending for Military”, *Washington Post*, March 6, 2001, A1.

<sup>3</sup> PACOM Home page, Mission.Slide, available from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/mission-values.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

of options for effective response to a myriad of missions. Force providers in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps enable USCINCPAC to implement these viable options in dealing with regional shaping and crisis response situations. These options are executed in the form of force packages designed to provide the proper amount of military force to bring conflict resolution.

One of the larger forces available in theater, and the only infantry division (ID) available to the PACOM Commander, is the Army's 25<sup>th</sup> ID (Light). Though a highly capable fighting unit in the role of light, dismounted combat, the Army may need to provide the PACOM Commander with a more relevant force; the current light division organization may not be as agile and responsive as Pacific theater threats demand. With the dynamic and ever-increasing theater threats, a concern arises as to whether the PACOM Commander has forces able to meet his strategic requirements. Can the transformation of the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) into an Interim Division (IDIV) better enable the PACOM Commander to meet the strategic land warfare requirements in the Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR)?

## **Background**

The world continues to evolve into a more uncertain and complex environment. Advances in certain information technologies have given potential adversaries powerful asymmetric weapons with which to expand the potential nature and scope of future threat operations. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the binding of friendly capabilities to vulnerable computers systems gives asymmetric attacks the potential to deliver lethal consequences.

Faced with the reality of U.S. military intervention, threat elements have already demonstrated they will seek to avoid U.S. strengths by using asymmetric capabilities and low technology to negate U.S. high technology systems. These threats include the proliferation of arms among nations holding conflicting regional interests, powerful

transnational criminal organizations, and ethnic groups seeking sovereignty or self-interests through violent means. Coupled with the anticipated rise of peer and potential major military competitors beyond the year 2015, these threats to regional stability significantly challenge the ability of the United States to further its domestic and international interests.

### **Significance**

In response to these threats, the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, has implemented a force design plan to meet the current and future operational needs of the regional CINCs. He envisions the Army being responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of likely operations with “. . . an array of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable formations.”<sup>4</sup> The new force will provide a more responsive capability for smaller-scale contingencies (SSC) that will not compromise major theater war (MTW) requirements. The new force is designed to function as a self-contained combined arms combat force for stability and support operations (SASO) and, with augmentation, to fight as part of a division in a MTW. Most importantly, the new force will be built around infantry with rapidly deployable organizations that capitalize on the integration of combat support systems and combined arms.

The new force design is called the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has already begun the process of facilitating the transformation of the first two brigades from units located at Fort Lewis, Washington. The next logical step in the transformation to meet CINC needs is the formation of a larger organization that can sustain itself for extended unsupported operations, which is the intent of the design for the new Interim Division or IDIV.

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<sup>4</sup> Louis Caldera and Eric Shinseki, “Army Vision,” *Military Review*, September-October 2000, 3.



## **Methodology**

The requirements for strategic land warfare and SASO operations for USCINCPAC will be identified by examining the strategic environment of the Pacific Rim and the key countries that comprise the PACOM AOR. A determination will then be made as to whether assets available to the PACOM Commander are capable of responding to these strategic requirements. The examination will include a review of the current capabilities of the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) and its ability to provide the PACOM Commander with assets able to accomplish the land component missions of the full spectrum of operations.

Another review will detail the Interim Division concept and outline enhancements or shortfalls the IDIV may provide in meeting PACOM AOR needs. Finally, a proposal for transforming the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) into an IDIV will be explored and the new 25<sup>th</sup> IDIV capabilities will be matched to the strategic requirements of the PACOM Commander.

Chapter 2 examines the PACOM AOR to determine the strategic requirements. The study includes consideration of geography as well as potential threats in the Asia-Pacific AOR to determine PACOM strategic land warfare and SASO requirements. These strategic requirements become the measuring stick for the capabilities of the land warfare assets currently available to PACOM as well as the capabilities of the proposed IDIV organization.

Chapter 3 examines the current capabilities of the PACOM Commander to meet his AOR strategic land warfare and SASO requirements. Army, Air Force, Marine and Naval components are considered for the full strategic picture, but emphasis is placed on the Army and Marine element for providing the strategic land warfare resources. The review of units assigned to the PACOM AOR includes I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), III MEF, and the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L).

Chapter 4 examines the design and objectives of the Army transformation force

structure. A proposed transformation of the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) into the IDIV structure is explored. The discussion matches the IDIV capabilities with the strategic land warfare and SASO requirements of the PACOM Commander. A review of the Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) and their capabilities will provide insight into what the IDIV can be expected to offer.

Chapter 5 provides analysis and conclusions regarding the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) transformation. The findings of the previous chapters are discussed and synthesized with recommendations made to the PACOM Commander regarding the transformation of the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) into the IDIV force structure.

### **Scope**

After identifying what this study is about, it is necessary to clarify what the paper is not. The paper covers the suitability of the IDIV being placed in the PACOM AOR, but avoids the issues of the feasibility and acceptability of such a decision. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5 defines suitability as the ability to accomplish the mission and comply with the commander's guidance. Feasibility is defined as the capability to accomplish the mission in terms of available time, space and resources, while acceptability considers the operational advantage gained against the cost in resources.<sup>5</sup> This study takes the strategic land warfare requirements of USCINCPAC and attempts to answer them with a conceptual organization based upon projected capabilities. The organization and technologies called for in fielding the IDIV do not currently exist. A complete study of the feasibility and acceptability of an IDIV in the PACOM AOR is outside the scope of this paper.

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<sup>5</sup> Department of The Army, FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, (Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 31 May 1997) 5-11.

## **Chapter 2: Strategic Land Warfare Requirements**

*The uncertainties of the future environment will preclude design of mission-specific units; our forces must be mission capable across the full spectrum of operation.*<sup>6</sup>

*MG Dubik, Chief of IBCT Transformation*

To understand the complexity of the PACOM environment, the geography, demographics, and economics of the AOR must first be examined. Additionally, a look into the potential threats will provide the background to determine the strategic land warfare requirements for full spectrum operations. These strategic requirements become the measuring stick for the capabilities of the land warfare assets, both current and potential.

The Pacific AOR contains many variables that require in-depth review to understand what response capabilities are necessary. In his address to the 2001 Pacific Symposium<sup>7</sup>, Brigadier Steve Ayling of the Australian Defence Force describes the Pacific region as “encompass[ing] a large number of countries, all different to each other in terms of economic development, social structures, political systems, religion and culture.”<sup>8</sup> Ayling continues the analysis by noting that even with the globalization influences of the information revolution and increasingly liberalized international trade, the Pacific region will remain diverse and characterized by a wide range of national goals, aspirations, and determination for national independence. Dealing with such a dynamic region will bring serious challenges. Ayling understands the Asia-Pacific region

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<sup>6</sup>James Dubik, “IBCT at Fort Lewis,” *Military Review*, September-October 2000, 17.

<sup>7</sup> Pacific Symposium is an annual gathering of Pacific Rim nations hosted by the National Defense University, co-sponsored by the USPACOM in cooperation with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. The symposium examines current regional perspectives on multinational security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and attempts to identify possible approaches that could lead to enhanced regional cooperation. Speakers from various countries presented issues including China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Australia, and the United States.

<sup>8</sup> Stephen H. Ayling, UNTAC and INTERFET – A Comparative Analysis, available from <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2001/aylingpaper.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01, 2.

as standing in stark contrast to Western Europe, where historical, economic, social and political influences and directions have converged to be compatible enough to have allowed the formation of the European Union and the deployment of NATO-based coalitions within that region.<sup>9</sup>

The challenging dynamics with which PACOM must contend have many factors which, upon review, assist in determining the strategic land warfare requirements. This study considers two areas for review – the AOR itself, and the threat factors within the AOR. The AOR considerations include the geography, demographics, and economics. The threat factors considered include the history of conflict among theater nations and ethnic groups, the disposition of armed forces, and potential crisis areas. Based on these AOR and threat considerations, the strategic land warfare requirements for the PACOM commander will be determined.

#### **Area Of Responsibility Considerations**


The Pacific AOR is a most dynamic and challenging environment. A review of the regional geographic, demographic, and economic factors will provide a reference point towards determining the PACOM strategic land warfare requirements.

**Geography.** The enormous expanses of water and land, coupled with the tremendous diversity in terrain and climate, only begins to display the demanding complexities of the region. The PACOM AOR, the largest of all CINC AORs, covers more than fifty percent of the earth's surface or approximately 105 million square miles (see Figure 1). This large expanse extends from the west coast of the continental United States to the east coast of Africa, and from the Arctic to the Antarctic. United States territories in the AOR include the states of Alaska and Hawaii, as well as the islands of Guam, Samoa, and Wake. The region traverses sixteen time zones and

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<sup>9</sup> Stephen H. Ayling, UNTAC and INTERFET – A Comparative Analysis, available from <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2001/aylingpaper.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01, 2.

incorporates nearly sixty percent of the world's population.<sup>10</sup>



**Figure 1: The PACOM AOR<sup>11</sup>**

The PACOM AOR geographic characteristics contain points of friction for those in the area. The vast expanses of ocean cover most of the world's major sea-lanes of communications, including the vital oil trade routes that link Southwest Asia with the Pacific Basin nations. More than 60,000 vessels pass thorough the Malacca Strait each year, a number expected to grow to more than 100,000 in the next four years. The total coastline in the area spans 130,000 miles – not including the island states. Conflict arises among inhabitants in the AOR for these important waterways and coastlines . The number of unresolved claims over islands and reefs that lie along the major shipping lanes is a constant source of international friction.<sup>12</sup>

With the large geographical expanse comes a wide variety of terrains and

<sup>10</sup> MARFOR Homepage, PACOM AOR Slide Notes, available from <http://www.mfp.usmc.mil/cmdbrf/sld005.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

<sup>11</sup> PACOM Home page, Mission Slide Notes, available from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/mission-values.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

<sup>12</sup> MARFOR Homepage, Major Crude Oil Trade Routes Slide Notes, available from <http://www.mfp.usmc.mil/cmdbrf/sld026.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

climates. From the jungles of Southeast Asia to the Himalayan Mountains to the deserts in China and Australia, the range is as enormous as are the issues even in simple things like soil and water supply. The various climates found in the Pacific Rim also cover the realm of possibilities, from the Arctic to the Tropics with the entire range of temperatures and humidity in between.

**Demographics.** The large number of countries, the huge growth in population, and the proliferation of religious and cultural diversities make dealing with AOR issues a real challenge. There are forty-three countries, twenty territories and possessions, and ten U.S. territories in the PACOM region. The AOR population of 3.57 billion accounts for sixty percent of the world's total.<sup>13</sup> The large population is, however, not evenly distributed, resulting in many densely populated areas as well as extensive barren and uninhabited regions. The religious diversities stem from three major religions in the AOR: Muslim, Christianity, and Hinduism. Governmental differences span the range from communism to authoritarian to democracy. The infrastructure in most of the countries in the Pacific AOR is poor, typical of the third world. All these diversities contribute in making the PACOM AOR challenging for conflict avoidance.

**Economics.** International trade by the nations in the PACOM AOR plays a major role in the world economy. The region boasts a thirty-four percent share of the Gross World Product (GWP). By comparison, the United States accounts for twenty-one percent of the GWP. The Asian-Pacific region receives the largest percentage of U.S. trade at thirty-five percent, amounting to more than \$548 billion in 1998. The European Union accounts for nineteen percent of the U.S. trade, Canada twenty percent, and Latin America eighteen percent. The impact of Pacific AOR economics on regional and global economics is highly significant. To help maintain regional stability and ensure continuity

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<sup>13</sup> Ye Ru'an, Security Environment in Asia-Pacific: Opportunities and Challenges for China, available from <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2001/aylingpaper.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/27/01, 1.

and growth of trade, the U.S. has established seven mutual defense treaties, five of which are concerned with the PACOM AOR: the U.S. and the Republic of the Philippines (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1952), the ANZUS (Australia - New Zealand - U.S., 1952), the U.S.-Republic of Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1954), the South East Asia Collective Defense (U.S. - France - Australia - New Zealand - Thailand - Philippines, 1955), and the U.S.-Japan (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1960).

**Significance to the Force.** The geographic, demographic, and economic factors of the Pacific Region make the introduction of military force a difficult challenge. Geographically, the region covers extremely large distances that dictate rapid responses having to rely either on air delivery, or on having forces constantly forward deployed if timely delivery by sea is to be feasible. Any military force required to meet PACOM land warfare requirements must be rapidly deployable. The force is also required to possess the capability for maneuver while in country to be able to reposition, as the situation demands, all the while being able to negotiate a wide variety of terrain within the entire gamut of climates. The force must have the ability to communicate and exchange data from the far corners of the Pacific AOR. The force must be adaptable to handle a myriad of missions across the spectrum of military operations. Additionally, the poor regional infrastructure mandates a force that can sustain itself until follow-on forces can provide the logistical sustainment base. Since the region accounts for one-third of the world's gross trade, the PACOM land force must be able to contain a conflict to the countries involved so as to avoid crippling the entire region economically. And the force must be responsive so as to arrive early enough to complete all these requirements.

### **Strategic Threat Considerations**

Having established the major land force requirements imposed by the AOR, a review of the strategic threats that exist in the AOR is in order. Considering the range of weapons available in the region--from small arms to T-90 main battle tanks to nuclear

devices--the threats to U.S. interests from elements in the Pacific region cannot be disregarded or taken lightly. The PACOM Commander, Admiral Blair, recently wrote in the *Washington Quarterly* regarding the challenges in maintaining regional security and fostering peaceful development in the Pacific AOR. One of the major challenges he cites is the number of unresolved wars that have been contained for more than 50 years, including the situation in Korea, the tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and the recurring clashes in the Kashmir Region. Major powers like China, Russia, and India appear dissatisfied with their current international status and actively compete for greater roles in the regional security arena.<sup>14</sup> Japan also seeks an updated security policy as a new generation comes to power. This dissatisfaction with the international status quo and with wars left unresolved portends a continuing unstable environment.

Unresolved territorial disputes provide additional challenges in the AOR as well as long-standing pockets of violence driven by separatist movements, religious fervor, and historic grievances in places such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands. Criminal elements take advantage of these frictions by profiting from weapons proliferation, terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, and piracy. All of these issues require cooperation among the regional nations if they are to be addressed effectively.<sup>15</sup> Such cooperation is not easily found when the parties involved are faced with territorial disputes dating back for generations.

Other threats to peace and stability lie even deeper than these unresolved territorial disputes. The forces of globalization have aggravated historic animosities. The pressures of population growth, growing demand for increasingly scarce resources,

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<sup>14</sup> At the recent 2001 Pacific Symposium, Brigadier Vijai K. Nair spoke on India's concerns. "India's main concern at the global level is a continuing uncertainty about the shape of the new international order and the attempts being made by some of the stronger global powers at creating a discriminatory world order dominated by them." India's policy framework should include "...developing a common strategy with other like minded third world countries to fight attempts being made to impose discriminatory regimes on them."

<sup>15</sup> Dennis Blair, "From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements," *Washington Quarterly*, (Washington, D.C.: Winter 2001) 7.



internal ethnic and religious strife, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal drug trafficking plague both Southwest Asia and the Pacific-Indian Ocean basins.<sup>16</sup> Considering the fact that the world's six largest armed forces all operate in the region (the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the United States, Russia, India, North Korea, and South Korea), as well as four of the world's nations with the capability of employing nuclear weapons (U.S., PRC, Russia, and India), the potential for conflict is never far from erupting into disaster.

**Significance to the Force.** The regional threat situation covers the range of contingencies – from smaller-scale to major conventional to nuclear. Potential missions for the PACOM land forces run the gamut from humanitarian relief and natural disasters, to peacekeeping interventions like East Timor, to conventional war on the Korean front, to nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India, to armored land combat against the Chinese T-90 main battle tank. Clearly, the PACOM Commander must have a full range of crisis response options to remain strategically viable in the Pacific AOR. A force employed by USCINCPAC must on the one hand be lethal enough to fight heavy armored forces and still survive to remain viable for future conflict, while on the other hand be able to effectively conduct low impact relief operations without adversely impacting the delicate political, ethnic, and environmental status characteristics of the AOR.

### **Strategic Requirements**

The PACOM mission statement emphasizes the enhancement of regional security and the promotion of peace. From the PACOM Homepage, the top three goals in achieving this mission are:

- enhance security in the Asia-Pacific region

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<sup>16</sup> MARFOR Homepage, Major Crude Oil Trade Routes Notes, available from <http://www.mfp.usmc.mil/cmdbrf/sld026.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

- sustain, train, and maintain readiness to fight and win with allies if possible, unilaterally if necessary
- be prepared to respond to crises short of war.<sup>17</sup>

Admiral Blair discusses the strategy behind the all-important pursuit of regional security. “The confluence of security, economic and diplomatic interests in the Asia-Pacific requires us to work security issues concurrently. Security provides the foundation for stability, which in turn, yields opportunities for nations to pursue economic prosperity.”<sup>18</sup> In other words, USCINCPAC believes security in the region is paramount.

The PACOM Homepage lists five elements of strategy for ensuring regional security. The first and fifth elements address the crucial ability to judiciously and adaptively employ military force.

- U.S. Military forces—credible, combat capable; trained and ready to fight and win; balanced and joint.
- Positive security relationships with all nations in the region
- Long-term commitment and long-haul solutions—the U.S is here to stay.
- Teamwork with the State and Commerce Departments, and other U.S. government agencies
- Measured responses to regional events—promoting peaceful resolution, including preparation to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.<sup>19</sup>

In translating these strategic elements from the USCINCPAC mission into strategic land warfare requirements, several of other sources will be considered to provide the practical, the theoretical, and the doctrinal views. From the practical viewpoint, Australian Army Brigadier Steve Ayling, in his address to the 2001 Pacific Symposium, provides additional light on requirements in the Pacific Region. From the theoretical perspective, Dr. James J. Schneider from the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, address as the operational aspects of military forces. Finally, CGSC ST 3.0, *Operations*, will be reviewed for the doctrine regarding

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<sup>17</sup> PACOM Home page, Mission.Slide, available from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/mission-values.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

<sup>18</sup> PACOM Home page, Mission.Slide, available from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/mission-values.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

<sup>19</sup> PACOM Home page, Mission.Slide, available from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/mission-values.htm>;

full spectrum operations.

In his speech, Brigadier Steve Ayling discusses guidelines for implementing future coalitions that are drawn from lessons learned in Cambodia and East Timor. The guidelines he highlights as vital to success are: command and control (C2); intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); tailored effects; force projection; force protection; force sustainment; and force generation. Even though Brigadier Ayling focuses his thoughts on coalition building, his guidelines provide insight into the critical aspects of a force being used in the Pacific AOR based upon years of experience and numerous deployments.

From a theoretical viewpoint, Professor James J. Schneider wrote of the structure of operational art in *The Structure of Strategic Revolution*. He describes operational art as characterized by the distributed operation: an ensemble of deep maneuver and distributed battles extended in space and time but unified by a common aim, namely, the retention of friendly, or the denial of enemy, freedom of action.<sup>20</sup> Schneider considers several characteristics as key to exercising this operational art, including distributed logistics, instantaneous communications, and formation durability.

Distributed operational logistics involves the movement and sustainment of armies in the field.<sup>21</sup> "Without the condition of successive or nearly continuous logistics, operational formations do not possess sufficient endurance to conduct distributed operations."<sup>22</sup> Logistics makes it feasible to exercise operational art.

The distributed nature of forces deployed in a theater of operations demands instantaneous communications to maintain control. "Unlike classical conditions the distributed deployment of forces creates a greater variety of unexpected or unanticipated

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Internet; accessed 2/27/01.

<sup>20</sup> Schneider, 35.

<sup>21</sup> Schneider, 40.

<sup>22</sup> Schneider, 52.

tactical and operational possibilities.”<sup>23</sup> Communications facilitates the command and control of the exercise of operational art.

Schneider’s operationally durable formations concept states: “the system of continuous logistics and instantaneous communications helped to create operationally durable formations, formations capable of conducting indefinitely a succession of distributed operations.”<sup>24</sup> Schneider continues with the operationally durable formation as the primary engine of operational design: “it is the hammer that drives the operational chisel.”<sup>25</sup>

From a doctrinal viewpoint, ST 3.0, *Operations*, provides a view of full spectrum operations. The manual begins with “Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in joint and multinational operations. Army forces aggressively gain the initiative, maintain momentum, and exploit success to control the nature, scope, and tempo of full spectrum operations in war and military operations other than war.”<sup>26</sup>

ST 3.0 echoes Admiral Blair’s focus on providing security by making ‘shape the security environment’ one of the Army’s mission essential tasks.<sup>27</sup> The mission essential task list outlines what the Army does so the nation can employ its military power effectively across the full spectrum of operations in war, conflict, and peace. Appendix A displays the range of Army operations according to ST 3.0.

ST 3.0 gives seven attributes of strategically responsive forces around which the Army is redesigning itself. The seven attributes in ST 3.0 are: responsive<sup>28</sup>,

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<sup>23</sup> Schneider, 45.

<sup>24</sup> Schneider, 46.

<sup>25</sup> Schneider, 48.

<sup>26</sup> USA Command and General Staff College, *ST 3.0 Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Government Printing Office, 1 October 2000) vii.

<sup>27</sup> USA Command and General Staff College, *ST 3.0 Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Government Printing Office, 1 October 2000) 1-4. The Army Mission Essential Tasks include Close with and destroy enemy forces, Shape the security environment, Respond promptly to crisis, Conduct forcible entry operations, Conduct sustained land operations, Provide support to civil authorities, and Mobilize the Army.

<sup>28</sup> Responsiveness is an attitude that spans operational planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. It

deployable<sup>29</sup>, agile<sup>30</sup>, versatile<sup>31</sup>, lethal<sup>32</sup>, survivable<sup>33</sup>, and sustainable<sup>34</sup>. ST 3.0 recognizes that there may not be a single model deployment scenario that requires optimization of all seven force attributes, but unit commanders strive to train their forces to emphasize all seven.<sup>35</sup>

The following chart summarizes the requisite characteristics of a full spectrum land warfare force from all the sources heretofore discussed. As can be seen, five of the characteristics are listed by all sources: deployable, versatile, survivable, sustainable, and capable of global command, control, communications, a computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) abilities.

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establishes the conditions for successful operational and tactical maneuver at the outset of operations. Responsiveness is more than the ability to quickly deploy: it requires that the right Army forces—those the JFC needs to deter an adversary or take decisive action if deterrence fails—deploy to the right place at the right time. ST 3.0, 3-3.

<sup>29</sup> Deployable. Army forces combine training, facilities, soldiers, and equipment to deploy with speed and force. Commanders view deployment as more than getting people and equipment on ships and airplanes; they visualize the entire process, beginning with the fully operational unit deployed in theater, and reverse plan to the unit's predeployment location. ST 3.0, 3-3.

<sup>30</sup> Agility is a tenet of Army operations as well as a responsive force attribute. A responsive, agile force package is one that is sustainable and mobile enough to accomplish the mission. ST 3.0, 3-4.

<sup>31</sup> Like agility, versatility is a tenet of Army operations. Army forces conduct prompt and sustained full spectrum operations with forces tailored to accomplish the mission. Versatility requires Army force packages able to reorganize and adapt to changing missions. Commanders carefully tailor and sequence forces into theater, making sure forces have the necessary C2, combat, CS, and CSS assets. ST 3.0, 3-4

<sup>32</sup> Lethal. Army forces combine the elements of combat power to defeat the enemy. When deployed, every unit—regardless of type—generates combat power and contributes to the fight. The art of strategic responsiveness requires that commanders balance the ability to mass the effects of lethal combat systems against the requirement to deploy, support, and sustain the units that employ those systems. ST 3.0, 3-5.

<sup>33</sup> Survivable combines technology and methods that afford the maximum protection to Army forces. Lethality enhances survivability: lethal forces destroy enemies before they strike and can retaliate if necessary. ST 3.0, 3-5.

<sup>34</sup> Sustainable. Generating and sustaining combat power is fundamental to strategic responsiveness

<sup>35</sup> USA Command and General Staff College, *ST 3.0 Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Government Printing Office, 1 October 2000), 3-3.

AOR & THREAT CONSIDERATIONS	GEN Ayling	Dr. Schneider	ST 3.0, OPERATIONS	Common in All
Deployable	Force Projection	Operationally Durable Formation	Deployable	x
Able to Maneuver		Operationally Durable Formation	Agile	
Global C4SIR	Command and Control, ISR	Instantaneous Communications	Information Dominance	x
Adaptable to Differing Missions	Tailored Effects	Operationally Durable Formation	Versatile	x
Responsive to Contain Conflict		Operationally Durable Formation	Responsive	
Lethal to Armor		Operationally Durable Formation	Lethal	
Survivable	Force Protection	Operationally Durable Formation	Survivable	x
Sustainable	Force Sustainment	Distributed Logistics	Sustainable	x
	Force Generation			

**Figure 2: Strategic Land Warfare Requirements**

The five common attributes coincide with the strategic land warfare requirements for the PACOM AOR. They will be used as the basis for evaluating the suitability of the PACOM land warfare forces and the IDIV to meet AOR requirements.

### **Summary**

The PACOM AOR provides challenges on many levels. Geographically, the area is vast with varying terrain and large differences in climate. The area contains an austere infrastructure with limited access to large air and sea ports. Demographically, dense populations and diverse cultures, religions, languages, and value systems contend with equally varied forms of government. Economically, regional trade contributes to the GWP, but significant portions of the population remain in abject poverty.

The strategic threats to the region also provide challenges. The presence of the world's six largest armies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the variety of potential operational missions dictate the need for a responsive force capable of defending against major armor formations while also being capable of effectively

reacting to smaller-scale contingencies.

The challenges of the PACOM commander's AOR will continue to test U.S. strategic responsiveness to the limit. Student Text 3.0, *Operations*, defines strategic responsiveness as “require[ing] Army forces organized, trained, and equipped for global operations, and commanders and units proficient at force projection. Strategically responsive Army forces—including active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) forces based in the continental U.S. (CONUS) and overseas—generate and sustain maximum combat power at the time and place joint force commanders (JFCs) require.”<sup>36</sup> The strategic requirement for quick response to limit the ramifications to surrounding areas requires agile and rapidly deployable forces. Deployed forces, usually at the end of a long logistical tail in an extremely austere environment, require sustainability. And finally, forces deployed to locations where they are subject to the most modern threats and high technology weapons must be survivable.

All these factors demand strategic responsiveness from the USCINCPAC. Admiral Blair must be capable of providing acceptable responses to the demands of his AOR to ensure U.S. interests remain viable. The myriad of delicate situations in the theater calls for his having a wide range of options for dealing with the dynamic environment and its players. These options must include a land force that is deployable, versatile, survivable, sustainable, and that includes capabilities for global C4ISR. Chapter Three examines the current PACOM capabilities to meet these strategic land warfare requirements.

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<sup>36</sup> USA Command and General Staff College, *ST 3.0 Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Government Printing Office, 1 October 2000) 3-1.

## **Chapter 3: Capabilities**

The PACOM strategic land warfare requirements identified in Chapter Two demand a strategically responsive organization. USCINCPAC deters aggression at regional flashpoints by ensuring all elements are aware of his responsive capabilities, through regional partnership activities, and through humanitarian assistance. PACOM continually contends with the issues of racial and ethnic violence, terrorist activities, illegal drug trafficking, and piracy. The ability to maintain peace and stability in this culturally diverse and geographically vast region depends greatly on political, economic, informational, and military actions coordinated among the interagency and regional coalition partners. In providing the capability for military actions, USCINCPAC must have immediate access to land forces allocated to his use that are responsive and flexible. The PACOM organization consists of components from all Services, with several subordinate unified commands and joint task forces (see Appendix B). In the effort to enhance force capabilities, however, the CINC cannot transform any of the assets in his component organizations. The Services are resourced and responsible for providing forces that are capable of meeting warfighting CINC requirements.

### **Current PACOM Capabilities**

The Service components, subordinate unified commands, and standing joint task forces that make up PACOM are outlined at Appendices B through F. In the interest of covering the PACOM strategic land warfare requirements, this study will only consider the Marine Corps (Appendix C) and the U.S. Army (See Appendices D, E, and F) elements and their capabilities

**MARFORPAC.** As the largest field command in the U.S. Marine Corps, the peacetime combat forces and supporting installation Marines and Sailors total more than



80,000.<sup>37</sup> Headquartered at the Marine Corps Base Hawaii in Camp Smith, Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) includes nearly one-half of all active duty personnel in the Marine Corps. MARFORPAC major subordinate commands are I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) located in Southern California and Arizona, and III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) headquartered in Okinawa, Japan (see Appendix C).<sup>38</sup>

MARFORPAC has its limitations as a contingency operation force. Regular continuous commitments of the Marine forces in the Pacific theater, as well as the type of missions the Marines are trained and equipped to conduct, limit their use for full spectrum operations. Of the 22,000 U.S. Marines forward deployed around the world, almost half are from MARFORPAC. Their disengagement from current missions to fulfill other requirements would be difficult. In addition to the Pacific theater mission, MARFORPAC is also responsible for the MARFORCENT AOR.<sup>39</sup> The possible commitments in the Southwest Asia region are alone daunting, for example the need to maintain readiness to conduct non-combat evacuation operations (NEO) in the region of ongoing Israel-Arab tensions. Considering the enormous PACOM AOR and the current Marine commitments, MARFORPAC is stretched too thin already to meet PACOM strategic land warfare requirements.

Additionally, the Marines are trained and equipped to act as an initial entry force for combat operations. Their structure and task organization for combat makes for a small yet powerful force. Their austere logistical capabilities require significant support from the sea. The advantages of their rapid reaction capabilities are tempered by being constrained to short duration missions that allow the force to refit for the next conflict.

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<sup>37</sup> MARFOR Homepage, Force Laydown Slide Notes, available from <http://www.mfp.usmc.mil/cmdbrf/sld007.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

<sup>38</sup> PACOM Home page, Mission.Slide, available from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/mission-values.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

<sup>39</sup> MARFOR Homepage, MARCENT AOR Slide Notes, available from <http://www.mfp.usmc.mil/cmdbrf/sld006.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

With these considerations in mind, the next available force to meet the PACOM strategic land warfare requirements is the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC).

**USARPAC.** Headquartered at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, USARPAC is both the U.S. Army component of USPACOM and a major Army command (see Appendix B). The major USARPAC forces include:

- 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) at Schofield Barracks Hawaii,
- 172<sup>nd</sup> Brigade (Separate) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska,
- 196<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry Brigade at Fort Shafter Hawaii,
- U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama, Japan, and
- 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 1<sup>st</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne) located at Torii Station, Okinawa, Japan.

The Headquarters I Corps, located at Fort Lewis, Washington, is also under the command and control of USARPAC.

The two forces available for deployment within USARPAC are the Alaska Brigade (see Appendix E) and the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Light) (see Appendix F). The Alaska Brigade consists of two battalions of light infantry and one battalion of parachute infantry. All three battalions are cold weather trained and have vehicles specifically designed to travel and operate in the snow and Arctic climate. The 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) is configured as a typical light division with two light infantry brigades and an aviation brigade that are stationed on the island of Oahu in Hawaii. A third infantry brigade is stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Upon review of the deployable forces in USARPAC, neither the Alaska Brigade nor the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) meet the strategic land warfare requirements outlined in Chapter 2: deployable, versatile, sustainable, survivable, and containing global C4ISR capabilities. Both are light infantry units that require significant logistical augmentation. As light infantry, neither force is very mobile once in theater. The Alaska Brigade is oriented to cold weather fighting by virtue of their equipment and training. Figure 3 below summarizes the findings in the five areas of interests.

	<b>Alaska Brigade</b>	<b>25<sup>th</sup> ID (L)</b>
<b>Deployable</b>	<b>Air and Sealift required. Requires substantial Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) assistance. Equipped with 377 small unit support vehicles (SUSV – cross country snow vehicles), it has more tracked vehicles than an armor brigade.<sup>40</sup></b>	<b>Air and Sealift required. Requires substantial Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) assistance.</b>
<b>Versatile</b>	<b>Limited mobility once on ground provided by SUSVs. Organic equipment limits mission capabilities. (limited anti-armor, towed, artillery)</b>	<b>Limited mobility once on ground. Organic equipment limits mission capabilities. (limited anti-armor, towed, artillery)</b>
<b>Survivable</b>	<b>SUSVs not armored. No armored protection from small arms, artillery, armor. Very limited air defense and nuclear, chemical, and biological protection (NBC).</b>	<b>No armored protection from small arms, artillery, armor. Limited air defense and nuclear, chemical, and biological protection (NBC).</b>
<b>Sustainable</b>	<b>Requires significant augmentation in all classes of supplies.</b>	<b>Requires significant augmentation.</b>
<b>Global C4ISR</b>	<b>Limited by man-portable systems. Requires significant augmentation.</b>	<b>Limited by man-portable systems. Requires significant augmentation.</b>

**Figure 3. Strategic Land Warfare Requirements vs. Current Capabilities**

The inability of these allocated forces to meet the strategic requirements severely limits USCINCPAC options in responding to challenges to U.S. interests in the PACOM AOR.

### **Summary**

<sup>40</sup> Taken from the Alaska Brigade web page, [www.wainwright.army.mil/1bde/welcom.htm](http://www.wainwright.army.mil/1bde/welcom.htm). Accessed on 6 May 2001.

The PACOM Commander must accept significant risk in trying to meet AOR strategic land warfare requirements with on-hand forces. The only real deployable assets for strategic land warfare are the assets of the I & III MEF, the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) and the **Alaska Brigade**.

However, the I and III MEF have numerous ongoing commitments vital to U.S. interests in the region. Their combat capabilities are best suited for forced entry combat operations. They also have commitments to the CENTCOM AOR. As currently employed and equipped, MARFORPAC cannot meet the PACOM strategic land warfare requirements for full spectrum operations.

The remaining land warfare forces in USARPAC also fall short of meeting the strategic land warfare requirements of USCINCPAC. The Alaska Brigade, while responsive for forced entry operations with an airborne battalion, lacks the firepower and sustainability to take on air and armored threat forces with its current organization. Once committed, the airborne battalion requires significant logistical resourcing and does not have the combat power to conduct the full spectrum of combat operations. Once deployed, the Alaska Brigade lacks the mobility to move intratheater to provide flexibility in combat operations.

The 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) also fails to meet the PACOM Commanders strategic land warfare requirements under the current task organization. The three light infantry brigades lack the combat power to handle armored and air threats and require significant logistical support to deploy and to sustain operations. Once deployed, the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) lacks the assets to rapidly maneuver should the operational situation dictate.

USCINCPAC cannot meet the PACOM AOR strategic land warfare requirements with current assets. The forces available are not able to meet the requirements for strategic deployability, agility, versatility, survivability, sustainability, and global C4SIR. The question at hand is whether the deficiency would be resolved by the transformation

of the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) into an IDIV.

## Chapter 4: Transformation

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*Our Nation is at peace. Our economy is prosperous. We have strategic perspective and technological potential. This window of historic opportunity will grow narrower with each passing day. We can transform today in a time of peace and prosperity. Or we can try to change tomorrow on the eve of the next war, when the window has closed, our perspective has narrowed, and our potential limited by the press of time and the constraints of resources.*<sup>41</sup>

*General Eric K. Shinseki*

The discussion now turns to the Interim Division (IDIV) as an option for the PACOM Commander to meet his strategic land warfare requirements. A brief review of the U.S. Army transformation effort will be followed by a detailed discussion of the key building block of the IDIV, the Interim Brigade Combat Team or IBCT. The proposed IDIV structure and capabilities will then be addressed and matched to the PACOM strategic land warfare requirements for comparison.

Student Text 3.0 provides clear guidance on the Army's priorities. The Army's warfighting focus is meant to produce a full spectrum force that meets the needs of joint force commanders (JFC) in war, conflict, and peace.<sup>42</sup> Simply stated, it is the Army's responsibility to provide USCINCPAC with forces that meet the strategic land warfare requirements of his AOR as outlined in Chapter Two.

### **Army Transformation**

Army Transformation is based on the Army Vision that Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki announced last year: "Soldiers on Point for the Nation . . . Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War." The objective from this vision statement sets the goals for Army Transformation, calling on the Army to create "strategic dominance across the entire spectrum of operations" with seven broad goals. The seven goals are to make the

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<sup>41</sup> Eric Shinseki, AUSA Greenbook, (Arlington VA: Association of the United States Army, 2000-2001) 5.

<sup>42</sup> USA Command and General Staff College, *ST 3.0 Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States

Army more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.<sup>43</sup>

The complex process of Army Transformation has been conceptually represented in a single chart, which depicts (as arrows) the paths for development of three key elements: the legacy force, the objective force, and the interim force (see Figure 4). For approximately the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, three categories of Army forces will follow separate paths which will eventually merge during the second decade to create the final product, which is envisioned as a transformed Army – the objective force.<sup>44</sup>




Figure 4: Army Transformation<sup>45</sup>

The term legacy force is used to describe the major weapon systems that the Army has in its inventory today, principally the Army's primary ground combat maneuver vehicles: the M1 Abrams tank, the M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles, the armored fire support systems, and the combat-support vehicles. These systems are generally

Government Printing Office, 1 October 2000) 1-3.

<sup>43</sup> Dennis Steel, "The Hooah Guide to Army Transformation," *Army Magazine*, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, February 2001) 23.

<sup>44</sup> Dennis Steel, "The Hooah Guide to Army Transformation," *Army Magazine*, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, February 2001) 28.

<sup>45</sup> Dennis Steel, "The Hooah Guide to Army Transformation," *Army Magazine*, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, February 2001) 28.

categorized as the heavy force, and comprise the Army's mechanized infantry and armored divisions. The Army plans to continue upgrading the deployability and agility of the heavy force while simultaneously developing the lethality and survivability of the other elements. The legacy force will continue to be the Army's primary warfighting maneuver units for the foreseeable future.<sup>46</sup>

The interim force is a stopgap force in several ways and a leap-ahead force in other areas. The plan is to use available technology to reequip brigade-sized units to adapt them to meet more of the Army's mission requirements. The effort is intended to enable these units to deploy more quickly than the heavy forces but have more combat punch, ground mobility and soldier protection than the Army's light forces (airborne, air assault and light infantry units). The interim force has another purpose. While interim force units handle missions, they will also be used to develop much of the doctrine and training aspects of the objective force.<sup>47</sup>

The objective force represents the art of the possible: what can be done to equip, organize, and train units to assimilate the best aspects of the heavy, light, and interim forces. Futurists believe that the line distinguishing the heavy force and the light force will progressively blur. The objective force axis is designed to give the Army the means to make that blur possible while retaining all capabilities—the full-spectrum capabilities that are a linchpin of the Army vision.<sup>48</sup>

The Army Transformation charter addresses this conversion effort in phases. Phase I of the overall plan concerns organizing and equipping the initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs) and making them combat ready. Phase 2 is the establishment of the

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<sup>46</sup> Dennis Steel, "The Hooah Guide to Army Transformation," *Army Magazine*, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, February 2001), 28.

<sup>47</sup> Dennis Steel, "The Hooah Guide to Army Transformation," *Army Magazine*, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, February 2001), 29.

<sup>48</sup> Dennis Steel, "The Hooah Guide to Army Transformation," *Army Magazine*, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, February 2001) 29.



interim force (six to eight brigade combat teams and, possibly, a division headquarters). In Phase 3, the objective force is established.

This study discusses the possibility of the establishment of the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, as the prototype interim division. As has been shown, USCINCPAC, probably more than any other unified commanders, needs the enhanced capabilities for full spectrum land operations to meet the mission requirements of his AOR in protecting U.S. interests in his increasingly volatile AOR. But the beginning of any discussion of the IDIV must review the building block: the Interim Brigade Combat Team.

#### **Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT)**

The IBCT concept incorporates many recent technological advances into a fighting force with improved capabilities from various aspects. First, the IBCT structure and equipment provides the capability for achieving strategic maneuver dominance to the supported commander. Second, the IBCT airlift requirements have been significantly reduced from those of the heavy forces, in both costs and logistical constraints. At the same time, the IBCT organic assets afford greater freedom of action and mobility than the limited assets available to the light division.

The IBCT concept encompasses a personnel endstrength of approximately 3,500 soldiers. Pre-configured into ready-to-fight combined arms packages, the entire Brigade Combat Team can deploy within 96 hours of the first aircraft taking off from the airport of departure (APOD), as long as the required aircraft are available. The IBCT is also equipped to begin shaping operations immediately upon departure from the APOD. Though the IBCT cannot conduct forced entry operations, it does provide the joint force commander an improved capability to arrive immediately behind the force entry forces and begin operations to shape the battlespace and expedite decisions. Once committed, the brigade is organically equipped to sustain combat operations for up to

180 days without relief. Operationally, the brigade is designed to fight under a division or corps headquarters acting as the Army Component Command (ARFOR), or Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC), within a joint or combined force.<sup>49</sup>

MG James M. Dubik, Commander, 25 ID (L), describes the IBCT as the means for maximizing the use of technology to give full spectrum dominance to the supported commander. "The core operational capabilities of the Brigade rest upon excellent operational and tactical mobility, enhanced situational understanding, combined arms integration down to company level, and high dismount strengths for close combat in urban and complex terrain. Properly integrated, these core capabilities compensate for platform limitations that may exist in the close fight and lead to enhanced force effectiveness."<sup>50</sup>

The IBCT has numerous advantages over the traditional heavy force for meeting PACOM AOR threats. The airlift requirement for an interim brigade combat team (IBCT) is about half that of a standard heavy brigade. Exclusively using the C-17 transport for a baseline comparison, a heavy brigade combat team requires approximately 430 C-17 sorties to deploy, while an IBCT is designed to need only about 211 C-17 sorties. Operational and sustainment costs for an IBCT equipped with the recently acquired interim armored vehicle (see Appendix H), are projected to be \$4.7 million annually. Compared to the \$7.6 million expended for a Force XXI heavy brigade, this is an especially relevant consideration for times of fiscal constraint. In addition, the combat service support footprint of an IBCT is half the size of that for a Force XXI heavy brigade. A heavy brigade requires about 38 percent of its task organization to be dedicated to support; an IBCT requires 19 percent. About 570 fewer troops are required to support

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<sup>49</sup> James Dubik, IBCT Brigade Battle Book given to SAMS Class 2000, Volume I, 5.

<sup>50</sup> James Dubik, IBCT Brigade Battle Book given to SAMS Class 2000, Volume I, 5.

an IBC than to support a Force XXI heavy brigade.<sup>51</sup>

The preliminary findings are encouraging. The IBC is designed to provide full spectrum dominance while limiting the support requirements as compared to the traditional heavy brigade. This first step in the transformation process provides the foundation for meeting PACOM AOR land warfare force requirements. The Interim Division continues the journey.

### **IDIV Organization**

At first glance, the Interim Division looks very similar to that of the heavy division (see Appendix G). The IDIV organization consists of three IBCs with an Aviation Brigade, an Artillery Brigade, and a Maneuver Sustainment Brigade. Additionally, an Engineer Regiment remains at division level with three engineer line companies available for attachment to the IBCs.

From there the similarities break down quickly, however, with respect to capabilities. The strategic responsiveness of the IDIV is such that an IBC is expected to have its last element airborne within ninety-six hours of commencement of the airlift movement, and to be fully deployed for operations in the contingency location within 120 hours of that time. The IDIV is expected to be in place and fully operational within thirty days. The IBC capabilities for simultaneous deployment and shaping operations are also noteworthy. The IBC force package elements flow off the aircraft ready for immediate mission employment. The unit is able to begin shaping the theater environment as it deploys through its mere presence and through the ability to immediately conduct credible and coordinated operations.

The truncated deployment timeline provides for earlier conflict resolution. The earlier the effects of shaping can be placed on the area of operations, the less likely the

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<sup>51</sup> Dennis Steel, "The Hooah Guide to Army Transformation," *Army Magazine*, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, February 2001) 36.

conflict will spread. This factor of the IBCT deployment concept makes for earlier decisive operations.

The increased ease of deployment for the IBCT comes from several factors. The organic support capabilities allow for reduced reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) requirements, with little to no sustainment constraints in the contingency area of operations. Additionally, the IBCTs are not tied to the traditional large airfields that the heavy divisions require for servicing the C-5 Galaxy aircraft. This capability to deploy in smaller aircraft promotes non-linear operations with non-contiguous areas of operations. The IBCTs can be landed much closer to the decisive terrain and thereby facilitate earlier conflict resolution. A key mechanism for maintaining control of the entire deployment operation is the IBCT's networked C4ISR capability that seeks to ensure information superiority. Each IBCT has significant organic intelligence gathering capabilities, with the IDIV structure providing more assets for redundancy and improved analysis.

The characteristics of the IDIV allow the organization to be tailored to the mission at hand. The redundancy in available C2 nodes with the design of the headquarters at the division artillery, the aviation brigade, the maneuver combat teams, and the sustainment organizations allows for the dynamic task organization of force packages to meet specific missions requirements. This flexibility greatly increases the options available during troop-to-task analysis of all potential missions within theater. The IDIV also provides force options to the Army for a wider range of core Joint Task Force (JTF) missions. Simply put, the modularity of the IDIV structure facilitates simultaneously handling multiple missions with varying focus along the spectrum of operations.

The enabling mechanism for the effective employment of the IBCT and IDIV combat assets is the robust organic information collection and dissemination capabilities. The organic ability to establish C4ISR networks and sensor to shooter links provides a

unique means for conducting information operations on a global level. This ability to understand and control the conflict at the macro level also provides for implementation of economy of force options with only the necessary force being placed at the decisive point, leading directly to the goal of situational dominance.<sup>52</sup>

The IDIV structure is a measured improvement in providing USCINCPAC with increased options for the employment of Army land forces across the spectrum of operations.

### **Transforming the 25th ID (L)**

The RAND Corporation has conducted extensive research into the redesign of the Army's light infantry divisions. In *Lightning Over Water: Sharpening America's Light Forces for Rapid Reaction Missions*, the RAND Corporation records the shortfall in rapid-reaction capability in the Army. In so doing, RAND recommends three possible paths to correct the shortfall: enhance the current light forces, make the light forces smaller and increase their dispersion on the battlefield, and introduce maneuver capabilities to the light forces.<sup>53</sup>

The RAND study recommends exploration of all three options. The first option, enhancing the current light forces, envisions improving the current capabilities of the light infantry through the incorporation of new concepts in operational employment coupled with recent enabling technologies. The second option, making infantry elements smaller and more dispersed, looks at substantially reducing the size and footprint of the light force and transitioning much of its firepower to remotely located systems. The third option of introducing maneuver capabilities to the light infantry discusses equipping it with a lightweight family of vehicles and creating a medium weight

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<sup>52</sup> The author defines situational dominance as the ability to obtain situational understanding while denying the enemy the same capability.

<sup>53</sup> John Matsumura, "Lightning Over Water: Sharpening America's Light Forces for Rapid Reaction Missions." ( Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000) 9.

force.<sup>54</sup> The third option really gets to the core of the IBCT and IDIV concepts.

The study discussed the many benefits of the medium weight force and described it as “a rapid-reaction force that can achieve a much larger number of missions and that has greater offensive ability because of an enhanced mobility and firepower conferred by advanced vehicles.” Another advantage of upgrading the mobility of the light infantry into a medium force is the resulting increased flexibility to operate in different and dynamic environments and situations. Since heavy forces were usually not suited for those type of missions, often the only option left for planners is to send dismounted light forces into a situation that could rapidly exceed their capabilities. The medium force also has a greater capability to take on assignments across the spectrum of war, from smaller-scale contingencies to major combat operations, because of the protection from small arms and artillery shrapnel provided by the medium force's vehicle armor and mobility. A last advantage is the medium force's ability to enhance the effective employment of precision long-range weapons by linking munition guidance systems to on-site vehicles equipped with advanced reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and targeting acquisition (RISTA) and command and control (C2) technologies.<sup>55</sup>

The disadvantages of the medium weight force include the increased strategic airlift requirement and the longer time to deploy the unit as compared to a traditional light infantry force. Another disadvantage is the need for significant changes in force structure and training because of the addition of a new sophisticated family of vehicles into the force.<sup>56</sup> The comments in the third option of the RAND study are directly

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<sup>54</sup> John Matsumura, “Lightning Over Water: Sharpening America’s Light Forces for Rapid Reaction Missions.” ( Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 10.

<sup>55</sup> John Matsumura, “Lightning Over Water: Sharpening America’s Light Forces for Rapid Reaction Missions.” ( Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 156.

<sup>56</sup> John Matsumura, “Lightning Over Water: Sharpening America’s Light Forces for Rapid Reaction Missions.” ( Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 156.

relevant to the issue at hand. The RAND medium force is directly analogous to the IBCT, and the advantages and disadvantages listed are applicable.

### **Summary**

The benefits of the IDIV are numerous when compared to both the light and the heavy divisions. The heavy division poses great deployment challenges and requires significant sustainment assets once deployed. Additionally, the mobility of heavy divisions is often severely constrained by the austere infrastructure and complex terrain encountered in so many parts of the trouble spots in the world. Even though light infantry forces can deploy more quickly, their lack of the situational awareness, lethality, survivability, and tactical mobility required for full spectrum operations severely limits their effectiveness. Additionally, the light forces are not able to sustain themselves without significant augmentation.

The Army Transformation effort provides a bridging solution for meeting CINC land force requirements until the objective force is designed and fielded. The IBCT provides a capability that spans the current gap for the Joint Force Commander, and the IDIV expands the near-term joint force full spectrum operations capability that current legacy forces cannot provide. The inherent abilities of the IDIV to deploy and simultaneously shape the theater, and therefore decisively affect the crisis earlier, make the IDIV a force invaluable to the supported CINC.

## **Chapter 5: Analysis And Conclusion**

*The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.*<sup>57</sup>

*B.H. Liddell Hart*

Having considering the PACOM strategic land warfare capabilities demanded by the exceptionally diverse and dangerous AOR threats to U.S. interests, the assets currently available to USCINCPAC are not sufficient to provide appropriate and timely response to crises. If however, the IDIV lives up to expectations, it appears that the solution to this shortfall in capability may be at hand.

Chapter Two outlined the challenges posed by the PACOM theater and its players. The geographic area is enormous with endless diversity in terrain and climate. The availability of suitable infrastructure is always questionable. Any U.S. action taken in the AOR must always consider the operational impact of the size and capabilities of the numerous armed forces operating in the theater, the expanses of difficult and complex terrain that negate the advantages of precision weapons, and the hostile intents of many of the governments in the AOR.

All these considerations help shape the CINC's strategic land warfare requirements. These requirements dictate the need for forces that are rapidly deployable, versatile in dynamic situations, capable of their own force protection, able to sustain themselves and that contain robust and effective means for global C4SIR. The PACOM AOR demands a responsive, capable force that the PACOM Commander can dynamically adapt to meet changing threats with appropriate force that will enhance regional stability and minimize the spread of conflict.

As pointed out in Chapter Three, the PACOM Commander meets his strategic

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<sup>57</sup> Dennis Steel, "The Hooah Guide to Army Transformation," *Army Magazine*, (Arlington, VA:



land warfare requirements with great risk. The only deployable strategic land warfare assets he commands come from the I & III MEF, the 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) and the Alaska Brigade. The relatively few assets assigned to the I and III MEF are regularly deployed throughout the theater. As the Marine Corps units that hold the distinction of being deployed most often, the I & III MEF make up over half of the Marines Corps forces deployed at any given time. Additionally, MARFORPAC is also committed to meeting CENTCOM AOR requirements. With the focus of today's U.S. Marines being initial entry operations, the Marine Expeditionary Forces are far too busy and over committed to effectively take on additional crisis response roles for the PACOM Commander to meet his demanding strategic requirements.

The two land combat forces available from USARPAC, the 172<sup>nd</sup> Separate Infantry Brigade in Alaska and the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (L) in Hawaii, can both provide rapid response with light combat forces, primarily dismounted infantry. But once deployed, both forces have serious deficiencies in firepower and sustainability as they are currently organized. Once committed, the light infantry elements lack the combat power to handle most threats and require significant logistical support to deploy and sustain themselves. Once deployed, the light infantry lacks the assets for any type of rapid maneuver over any extended distance, a critical capability in establishing and maintaining the initiative in any type of military deployment. The forces available to USCINCPAC are not able to meet his strategic requirements of being rapidly deployable, versatile, able to provide their own force protection and force sustainment, and equipped with robust global C4SIR capabilities.

With the constant struggle to remain relevant, and in a quest to stay ahead of new and constantly emerging threats, the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, is directing the transformation of the Army. Through the use of the most up-to-date

technologies, General Shinseki seeks to increase full spectrum dominance of the Army by developing and acquiring combat systems that are more deployable, lethal, sustainable, survivable, agile, and versatile. The Interim Brigade Combat Team is the initial step in that direction. The success of this Army initiative is of supreme interest to USCINCPAC because his theater response capabilities are so dependent on the response options the Army is able to provide.

The prototype Interim Brigade Combat Team based at Fort Lewis, Washington, are each composed of three line battalions, a RSTA squadron, and various other units designed to provide effects-based fires. Deployable in 96 hours, the IBCT is meant to arrive at a location early enough to defuse the situation, restore order and stability, and prevent the spread of conflict. The IBCT is sufficiently deployable to land and arrive quickly, yet arrives with enough armor and firepower to handle the majority of combat operations that could be encountered along the spectrum of conflict.

To enhance the mission capabilities, survivability, and versatility of the IBCT, the IDIV will provide a robust C4ISR structure, more alternate C2 nodes, and complementary CSS assets. The modular structure of the IDIV makes it supremely adaptable to nearly any land warfare situation USCINCPAC is likely to face. The unique ability of the IDIV structure to be able to rapidly design and staff a JTF to meet practically any PACOM initial land warfare requirement, from one end of the spectrum of conflict to the other, makes it an indispensable asset to the CINC.

## **Conclusion**

The PACOM AOR is arguably the most demanding of all the regions within which the US military must plan to operate. The scope of the geographic, demographic, and economic problems is intimidating. Add to this the presence of the six largest armies in the world, and the widespread violence from ethnic, territorial and economic disputes, and the challenge is overwhelming. The PACOM Commander needs the best assets

that can be provided to respond to these challenges, including land forces that are rapidly deployable, versatile, survivable, sustainable, and capable of global C4ISR.

The IDIV provides a rapidly deployable force. “The IDIV requires minimal Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) allowing it to begin operations nearly concurrent with its arrival.”<sup>58</sup> This ability to get to the decisive area of operation quicker will lead to quicker conflict resolution with minimal spreading of turmoil.

The IDIV provides a versatile force. “Through its C2 capability and modularity of its organic components, the IDIV can be rapidly tailored through the acceptance of additional capabilities or by leaving behind organic capabilities unnecessary for specific operations.”<sup>59</sup> This enhanced ability to tailor the division creates operational agility, balance and versatility.<sup>60</sup> It allows the IDIV to quickly transition from one kind of operation to another, to operate in various environments (urban, mountainous, and desert), and to operate effectively in joint, interagency, and multinational environments as either a subordinate land component element, or as a JTF Commander and staff if the situation warrants.

The IDIV provides a survivable force. The 14 March Organizational and Operational O&O) plan describes it best: “The IDIV commander dominates his AO by using superior situational understanding (SU) to move rapidly to positions of advantage and deliver precision fires (both direct and indirect). Using superior SU, the IDIV will attack, disperse and attack again in rapid succession, creating a tempo the enemy cannot match, while simultaneously protecting friendly forces from effects of enemy systems.”<sup>61</sup> Such a force is survivable through its dominance on the field of engagement.

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<sup>58</sup> Combined Arms Command, IDIV O&O, version 3.8,(Fort Leavenworth, KS: 14 March 2001), 7.

<sup>59</sup> Combined Arms Command, IDIV O&O, version 3.8,(Fort Leavenworth, KS: 14 March 2001), 8.

<sup>60</sup> Combined Arms Command, IDIV O&O, version 3.8,(Fort Leavenworth, KS: 14 March 2001) 8.

<sup>61</sup> Combined Arms Command, IDIV O&O, version 3.8,(Fort Leavenworth, KS: 14 March 2001) 7.

The IDIV provides a sustainable force. It can “. . . sustain operations without support from higher echelons for a period of 72 hours.”<sup>62</sup> The logistics force package for each contingency will be tailored to provide a strategically mobile package, focused on the sustainment demands of the contingency with twin goals of optimizing the use of logistical resources (through combat service support SU) and minimizing the logistical footprint in the AO.<sup>63</sup>

And finally, the IDIV is capable of global C4ISR. The IDIV can operate effectively in joint, multinational, and interagency operations. “It has adequate C2 systems to maintain effective communications with joint and multinational forces.”<sup>64</sup> The C2 system provides secure, robust, and survivable long-range division communications networks for voice, data, and video. “It includes reachback capabilities to leverage installation, joint, and national databases and expertise.”<sup>65</sup>

The Army Chief of Staff is challenging his forces to remain relevant and to provide the CINCs with a more responsive, strategic dominating force. The Interim Division, or IDIV, is the next step in meeting that challenge. The IDIV possesses many capabilities and enhancements that will can provide the PACOM Commander with the range of strategic land warfare options he so desperately needs. The IDIV capabilities of agility, tailorability, survivability and sustainability are the answer to the strategic land warfare requirements of the PACOM AOR. The IDIV capabilities will satisfy the PACOM Commander’s current shortfall in meeting his strategic land warfare requirements. With the IDIV, the PACOM Commander is better enabled to meet the Pacific Rim strategic requirements.

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
<sup>62</sup> Combined Arms Command, IDIV O&O, version 3.8,(Fort Leavenworth, KS: 14 March 2001) 8. Compared to the 48 hours that the 25<sup>th</sup> ID(L) can operate without external support (from 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) Homepage, Mission, accessed 1 May 2001).

<sup>63</sup> Combined Arms Command, IDIV O&O, version 3.8,(Fort Leavenworth, KS: 14 March 2001), 13.

<sup>64</sup> Combined Arms Command, IDIV O&O, version 3.8,(Fort Leavenworth, KS: 14 March 2001) 3.

<sup>65</sup> Combined Arms Command, IDIV O&O, version 3.8,(Fort Leavenworth, KS: 14 March 2001) 21.

**Appendix A:**  
**FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS<sup>66</sup>**



**Figure 1-1. The Range of Army Operations**

Army doctrine addresses the range of full spectrum operations across the spectrum of conflict (see Figure 1-1). Army commanders at all echelons may combine different types of operations simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish missions in war and MOOTW. For each mission, the JFC and Army component commander determine the emphasis Army forces place on each type of operation. Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations in war and some SSCs. Stability operations and support operations predominate in MOOTW that include certain SSCs and PME.

Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations (see Figure 1-2, page 1-16). Missions in any environment require Army forces prepared to conduct any combination of these operations:

<sup>66</sup> USA Command and General Staff College, *ST 3.0 Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Government Printing Office, 1 October 2000), 1-15.

*Offensive operations* aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to impose US will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory.

*Defensive operations* defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative.

*Stability operations* promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances regional stability and economic prosperity simultaneously. Army force presence promotes a stable environment.

*Support operations* employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering. Domestically, Army forces respond only when the NCA direct. Army forces operate under the lead federal agency and comply with provisions of US law, to include the Posse Comitatus and Stafford Acts.

When conducting full spectrum operations, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations to accomplish the mission. The JFC and the Army component commander for a particular mission determine the emphasis Army forces place on each type of operation. Throughout the campaign, offensive, defensive, stability, and support missions occur simultaneously. As missions change from promoting peace to deterring war and from resolving conflict to war itself, the combinations of and transitions between these operations require skillful assessment, planning, preparation, and execution. Operations designed to accomplish more than one strategic purpose may be executed simultaneously, sequentially, or both. For example, within a combatant commander's AOR, one force may be executing large-scale offensive operations while another is conducting stability operations. Within the combat zone, Army forces may conduct stability operations and support operations as well as combat operations.

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## **Appendix B**

### **U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND**

#### **SERVICE COMPONENTS<sup>67</sup>**

- U.S. Army Pacific:
  - Headquarters, I Corps (Fort Lewis, Washington )
  - 25th Infantry Division (Light)/U.S. Army, (Hawaii)
  - U.S. Army, Japan/9th Theater Army Area Command (Japan)
  - U.S. Army Chemical Activity Pacific (Johnston Island)
  - 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade/U.S. Army, Alaska (Alaska)
  - 9th Regional Support Command (USAR)
- Marine Forces Pacific:
  - I Marine Expeditionary Force (California)
  - III Marine Expeditionary Force (Japan)
- U.S. Pacific Fleet:
  - THIRD Fleet (California)
  - SEVENTH Fleet (Japan)
- U.S. Pacific Air Forces:
  - Fifth Air Force (Japan)
  - Seventh Air Force (Korea)
  - Eleventh Air Force (Alaska)
  - Thirteenth Air Force (Guam)

#### **SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS**

- U.S. Forces, Japan (Yokota AB, near Tokyo)
- U.S. Forces, Korea (Yongsan Army Garrison, Seoul)
- Eighth U.S. Army (Yongsan Army Garrison, Seoul)
- Special Operations Command Pacific (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii)
- Alaskan Command (Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage)

#### **STANDING JOINT TASK FORCES**

- Joint Interagency Task Force West (Alameda, Calif.)
- Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii)

#### **ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING UNITS**

- Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (Honolulu, Hawaii)
- Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (Pearl Harbor, Hawaii)
- Center of Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance Studies (Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii)

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<sup>67</sup> PACOM Home page, Mission.Slide, available from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/mission-values.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

### **MARINE FORCES, PACIFIC/ FLEET MARINE FORCES, PACIFIC<sup>68</sup>**

The single largest U.S. Marine field command is designated as both Marine Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC) and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC). Headquartered at Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Camp H.M. Smith, MARFORPAC includes nearly one-half of all active duty personnel in the Marine Corps. MARFORPAC is comprised of two of the three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), each of which has a ground infantry division, an aircraft wing, service support group, and command element.

MARFORPAC is the Marine service component for USCINCPAC, and the designated component command for U.S. Central Command, and the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea. The forces are organized into Marine Air/Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) that may range from a 2,200 member Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to a 50,000 or larger MEF.

As the Marine component for U.S. Forces, Korea, MARFORPAC joins with the Republic of Korea (ROK) Marine Corps to form the Combined Marine Forces Command (CMFC). During hostilities, CMFC would be commanded by the MARFORPAC commander (COMMARFORPAC), who would deploy to Korea with his staff. CMFC's forces of about 100,000 ROK and U.S. personnel would play a significant role in the defense of the Republic of Korea as part of the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command. In their U.S. Central Command Marine component role, COMMARFORPAC and his staff would deploy to Southwest Asia (SWA) in the event of a major crisis.

MARFORPAC's major subordinate commands are I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), located in Southern California and Arizona, and III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), headquartered in Okinawa, Japan. The Commanding General of III MEF in Japan also commands III MEF Forces Hawaii, located at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. COMMARFORPAC is also the Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Pacific.

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<sup>68</sup> PACOM Home page, PACOM Facts, available from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.



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## **Appendix D**

### **U.S. ARMY PACIFIC<sup>69</sup>**

The U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), headquartered at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, is the both the U.S. Army component of the USPACOM and a major Army command. The Commanding General, USARPAC, exercises command and control of:

- U.S. Army Hawaii headquartered at Schofield Barracks Hawaii.
- 25th Infantry Division (Light) is a split-based organization, with the division headquarters, two light infantry brigades and support elements stationed at Schofield Barracks and one infantry brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington.
- 45<sup>th</sup> Corps Support Group (Forward) based at Schofield Barracks.
- U.S. Army Alaska headquartered at Fort Richardson, Alaska.
- 172nd Infantry Brigade (Separate) located at Fort Wainwright, Alaska.
- 196<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry Brigade headquartered at Fort Shafter, Hawaii.
- United States Army Japan (USARJ)/9th Theater Army Area Command (9th TAACOM) located at Camp Zama, Japan.
- U.S. Army Chemical Activity, Pacific located on Johnston Atoll.
- Headquarters I Corps located at Fort Lewis, Washington (operational).
- 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) located at Torii Station, Okinawa, Japan (administrative).

USARPAC's mission is to provide trained and ready Army forces to USCINCPAC in support of military operations and peacetime engagements in the Asia-Pacific area of operations in order to contribute to regional security, crisis response and decisive victory.

USCINCPAC exercises combatant command of Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) and U.S. Army, Japan through the subordinate unified commanders in those countries.

USARPAC also oversees, evaluates, and supports the National Guard in Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam, and has command and control of the Army Reserve in Saipan, Guam, American Samoa, Hawaii, and Alaska. The 196<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry Brigade helps Army National Guard and Army Reserve units maintain mobilization readiness. Headquarters, 9th U.S. Army Reserve Command augments active duty Army elements upon mobilization. The 29th Infantry Brigade of the Hawaii Army National Guard is now one of 15 "enhanced" separate infantry brigades nationwide.

Headquarters I Corps serves as one of USPACOM's standing Joint Task Force headquarters.

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<sup>69</sup> PACOM Home page, PACOM Facts, available from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 1<sup>st</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne) is the in-theater Army Special Operations Force (ARSOF).

U.S. Army Hawaii (USARHAW) works to improve the force projection capability of the 25th Infantry Division (Light). USARHAW administers the installation and training areas, conducts community relations and other issues.

Known as the Tropic Lightning Division, the 25th Infantry Division (Light) is capable of theater-wide deployment.

The 45<sup>th</sup> Corps Support Group (Forward) provides a range of combat support and combat service support capabilities. It can mobilize quickly in support of combat operations, disaster relief missions and other operations involving U.S. and foreign armed forces.

U.S. Army Alaska is the Army component of Alaskan Command. Its mission is to train and equip forces to deploy rapidly in support of combat operations in cold regions and mountainous terrain, to serve as the land force component command for joint operations, and to provide installation support in Alaska.

172nd Infantry Brigade (Separate) is the U.S. Army's premier cold weather specialists. It provides a strategically deployable force theater-wide for contingencies. Its airborne battalion provides the USCINCPAC with a force entry capability. This rapid strike force of about 3600 soldiers has the primary focus for low intensity conflict throughout the Pacific.

196<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade is a training support brigade for the Pacific region. Reserve Component soldiers from throughout the USARPAC AOR give the brigade the largest area of responsibility of any of the Army's 18 TSBs.

U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) is the Army component of U.S. Forces, Japan.

The U.S. Army Chemical Activity, Pacific secures and safely stores toxic munitions and delivers them to the disposal facility when requested. The facility, known as the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Destruction System (JACADS), began destroying chemical munitions on the island in 1990. Current estimates call for the completion of the mission by the year 2000.

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## Appendix E

### ALASKAN COMMAND<sup>70</sup>

The Alaskan Command (ALCOM) forces are responsible for maintaining air sovereignty, deploying forces to worldwide contingencies as directed by USCINCPAC, providing support to federal and state authorities during civil emergencies, and conducting joint training for the rapid deployment of combat forces. ALCOM also functions as JTF Alaskan Road. ALCOM headquarters is at Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage, Alaska. The command includes:

- U.S. Air Force Forces Alaska, Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage
- U.S. Army Forces Alaska, Fort Richardson, Anchorage
- U.S. Naval Forces Alaska, Juneau

ALCOM combined forces include approximately 18,000 Air Force, Army, Navy and Coast Guard personnel, and 3,600 guardsmen and reservists.

#### 172d Infantry Brigade (Separate)<sup>71</sup>

The 172d Infantry Brigade (Separate) is authorized 3,809 soldiers and is the largest infantry brigade and only Arctic infantry brigade in America's Army. It is the only infantry brigade assigned to two installations (Fort Richardson and Fort Wainwright) that are 360 miles apart, and with 377 small unit support vehicles (SUSVs—cross country snow vehicles), it has more tracked vehicles than an armored brigade. Task Force Geronimo, an airborne battalion combat team of approximately 1,100 soldiers, is one of two standing airborne battalion combat teams in the American Army (the other is located in Italy). Soldiers in Alaska train in the largest (and coldest) maneuver area in the world (1.5 million acres).

The mission of the 172d Infantry Brigade (Separate) reads : On order deploy worldwide, secure a lodgment, and conduct military operations in support of U.S. national interests.

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<sup>70</sup> PACOM Home page, PACOM Facts, available from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

The commander's vision reads: Artic tough — combat ready! The most combat ready brigade in America's Army, and the premier power projection force in the U.S. Army Pacific.

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<sup>71</sup> Snow Hawk Brigade Homepage, Welcome, available from <http://www.wainwright.army.mil/1bde/d-welcome.htm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

### 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT)<sup>72</sup>

**Mission:** The 25th Infantry Division (Light) prepares for deployment to a theater of operations to perform combat operations as part of a corps counterattack. On order, conducts theater-wide deployment within 54 hours of notification to perform combat operations in support of USCINCPAC theater strategy.

The Mission Essential Task List of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) is:

25th Infantry Division (Light) METL
1. Alert, Marshal, and Deploy
2. Conduct combat operations
3. Conduct C4ISR
4. Conduct Security, Support, Stability Operations
5. Sustain the force
6. Protect the force

Concept of employment: The 25th Infantry Division (Light) is organized to deploy anywhere in the world to conduct missions across the spectrum of warfare.

Today, the Light Fighters of the 25th ID(L), "Tropic Lightning" Division, are a rapidly deployable, potent, flexible, and lethal part of the Army's combat forces. This soldier-powered organization is offensively oriented. It is able to seek out and destroy the enemy on his terrain using initiative, stealth, and the element of surprise. Its trained and hardened soldiers operate at night or under conditions of limited visibility.

The vast majority of fighting takes place at team, squad, and platoon levels, usually out of the sight of battalion and even company Commanders. Superb leaders, soldiers with the skill and will to fight, and tough training are the Light Fighters' hallmarks. Light Leaders at every level demonstrate mastery of the profession of arms.

They are experts at skilled reconnaissance, resourceful planning, and violent execution; they demand the highest level of performance and discipline from their subordinates; and they are confident in their ability to delegate the highest levels of independence and freedom of action to subordinates. Light Infantry soldiers in turn have the initiative and training to utilize this freedom of action and have confidence in their leaders, their equipment, their fellow soldiers, and most importantly, in themselves.

Organization. The Division is organized with three Light Infantry Brigades (two at Schofield Barracks and one at Ft Lewis, Washington), an Aviation Brigade, a Division Artillery, a Division Support Command, an Air Defense Artillery Battalion, an Engineer Battalion, a Military Intelligence Battalion, a Signal Battalion, a Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company, a Military Police Company and a Division Band. In addition

<sup>72</sup> 25<sup>th</sup> ID (L) Home page, Mission, available from <http://www.25idl.army.mil/DivMission.cfm>; Internet; accessed 2/28/01.

to its organic, doctrinal structure, the Division has several corps level units assigned and stationed with it for training and deployment. These corps units include a Smoke/Decon Chemical Company, a Corps Military Police Company, a Field Artillery Detachment (Target Acquisition) and a Personnel Service Battalion. The Division organization is depicted in the diagram on the following page.

**Planning Factors.** The division can operate for 48 hours without external support. The 25ID(L) can be employed with minimal external support in a variety of scenarios, however it will usually be deployed as part of a Corps or Joint Task Force. The Division can then be supported with additional combat or support units from Corps level when required by a particular type of mission or threat. The units providing this type of support are referred to as “augmentations” and the determination of the type and quantity of augmentation is dependent on the specific mission.

As the strategic reserve for the United States Pacific Command (PACOM), the 25th Infantry Division (L) has a standing mission to deploy when directed and conduct combat operations on arrival. The Division must routinely commence deployment operations within eighteen hours of receipt of a deployment order and sustain the deployment flow to permit the entire Division to deploy within seven days.

**Capabilities.** The 25th Infantry Division (L) is a tactical force with strategic responsiveness and flexibility. It operates as a combined arms force with organic or attached / OPCON, or supporting infantry, armor, engineers, artillery, aviation, and air defense.


- The Division can conduct combat operations in contingency areas, usually as part of a larger force, to include operations day or night, under all climatic conditions and on any terrain against light or mechanized enemy forces.
- The Division can deploy an entire brigade task force.
- Compared to mechanized divisions, the 25th ID (L) requires far less logistical support and infrastructure.
- Across the spectrum of conflict the 25th ID (L) has the capability of decisively completing its missions.

The missions which deploying units of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) may perform include both combat and non-combat operations. These missions include:

- (1) Attack to defeat enemy forces or seize key terrain.
- (2) Defend to defeat enemy forces or to retain key terrain.
- (3) Battalion sized Air Assault Operations.
- (4) Operations in close or urban terrain (MOUT).
- (5) Reinforce or be reinforced by allied force or US and participate in combined / joint operations.
- (6) Rear Operations.
- (7) Screen.
- (8) Reconnaissance in Force.
- (9) Counter-Insurgency.
- (10) Civil Disturbance.
- (11) Disaster Relief.
- (12) Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA).
- (13) Peace Enforcement Operations.
- (14) Peace Keeping Operations.

- (15) Show of force.
- (16) Evacuation of US citizens.


## Interim Division (IDIV)



**Key Qualities . . .**  
**Strategic Responsiveness**  
**Achieves Superior Effects**  
**Fights Differently**



## **LAV III Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV) Performance Characteristics**



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